Introduction
R&D uncertainty and high risk are two problems that both innovating firms and R&D institutions regularly confront in practice. The former refers to high stochastic R&D outcomes and the high probability of R&D failure, which can result in substantial losses for innovators; the latter involves the possibility that the results of successful R&D cannot be successfully commercialized and converted to use. Thus, technology licensing is a crucial component of technology commercialization strategies that exerts an important influence on improving products' market competitiveness, increasing innovation incentives and enhancing innovation capabilities. Moreover, the past 30 years have witnessed significant growth in global technology trade (Arora, 2009) , and an increasing number of firms are now transferring rights to various technologies through licensing agreements (Arora et al., 2013) . For example, in the computer industry, IBM made $1.3 billion profit by licensing out its patents in 2000 (i.e.,10 % of its pretax profits). In the semiconductor industry, Texas Instruments earns $40 million annually from patent licensing (Germerad, 2001) .
Technology transfer via licensing benefits both licensors and licensees. On the one hand, licensees who obtain new technology through licensing can improve their market competitiveness by closing the technology gap with licensors (Laursen et al., 2010; Tsai et al., 2011; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Wang et al., 2015) . On the other hand, licensors -who often require a high level of investment to engage in technology innovation -can maximize the value of new technology generated by successful R&D via various licensing strategies that provide financial support for further innovation. The average annual yield of technology innovation is 40 %, which is much higher than the average annual yield of common investment−8 % (Griliches, 1992) .
In the following, we will briefly outline the extant Xianpei Hong, Qiang Lu, Lei Xu, Kannan Govindan, Ieva Meidute. Licensing Strategy for a Stochastic R&D firm in… -479 -technology licensing literature. The literature on technology licensing strategy has primarily developed along two lines. One stream of the literature examines optimal licensing strategies for outside innovators (e.g., Mukherjee, 2010; Li & Wang, 2010; Kishimoto et al., 2011; Rey & Salant, 2012; Chang et al., 2013; Bagchi & Mukherjee, 2014) . For example, Mukherjee (2010) introduces unions to the research and classifies these by whether they have centralized or decentralized structures. The result shows that as long as the union has full bargaining power (i.e., a monopoly union; see (Leahy & Montagna, 2000; Haucap & Wey, 2004) , royalty licensing is superior to the other two strategies in spite of the union structure for outside innovators. (Kishimoto et al., 2011) study asymptotic bargaining outcomes when licensing a patented technology from an outside innovator to firms in a general Cournot structure. (Chang et al., 2013) consider a vertically related market structure in which the outside patentee licenses a cost-reducing technology to one or both downstream firms through either a fixed-fee or royalty licensing agreement.
Moreover, many studies examine firms' optimal licensing strategies from the perspective of information structure by investigating the outside innovator's optimal licensing strategy under incomplete information (see Gallini & Wright, 1990; Poddar & Sinha, 2002; Sen, 2005) . For example, (Sen, 2005) considers the outside innovator's licensing problem with an incumbent monopoly under incomplete information and argues that diversification in optimal licensing mechanisms results from incomplete information regarding the incumbent monopoly firm's cost, which might be one reason for the coexistence of a variety of licensing mechanisms in practice.
The second stream of the literature examines the inside innovator's optimal licensing strategy (e.g., Wang, 2002; Mittendorf & Arya, 2006; Wang et al., 2013; Lu & Poddar, 2014; Zhao et al., 2014; Ghosh & Saha, 2015; Colombo & Filippini, 2015) . For example, (Wang, 2002) compares fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing in homogeneous and differentiated Cournot duopolies, respectively. (Mittendorf & Arya, 2006) show that a producer-innovator's patent licensing cannot only benefit the licensor, but can benefit other supply chain members (the supplier, licensee, and consumers). (Wang et al., 2013) extend the results from (Poddar & Sinha, 2010 ) to an oligopolistic model consisting of three cost differential firms in a Cournot framework to explore optimal licensing strategies.
In addition, the previous literature -including (Filippini, 2005; Kabiraj, 2005; Erkal, 2005; Mukherjee & Pennings, 2006 ) -attempts to indentify the incumbent innovating firm's optimal licensing strategy by proceeding from the enterprise's competition pattern. (Filippini, 2005; Kabiraj, 2005) employ a Stackelberg competitive model and argue that royalty licensing is always superior to fixed-fee licensing. However, both (Erkal, 2005; Mukherjee & Pennings, 2006 ; focus on a Bertrand competitive market and find that the degree of product substitution and the innovation scale play a vital role in the optimal licensing strategy, regardless of the competitive model. A common feature of the studies described above is that they assume that the R&D outcome is certain and that there is no technology spillover 1 . In practice, however, it is frequently the case that the outcome is inclined to be stochastic to some degree and that there is technology spillover, which may have an important impact on the optimal licensing strategy. However, the literature to date has not focused on uncovering the relationship between R&D outcome uncertainty and technology licensing, which is an important element of conduct in many industries. Theoretical interest in this paper arises from the fact that no other work to date has discussed the problem under R&D outcome uncertainty.
In this paper, the innovator is an insider and the product market has a differentiated Cournot duopoly structure. The innovator has a cost-reducing innovation and three substitutive licensing policies, namely, fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing and two-part tariff licensing. We assume that the licensor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the licensee, and the licensee is assumed to accept the license when it is indifferent as to whether to license (or not) or when it achieves a higher payoff by licensing.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the following two issues by considering a stochastic R&D process for the innovator when the innovator is an insider patentee as firms produce a differentiated product and engage in Cournot competition. First, this paper seeks to determine the stochastic R&D firm's optimal licensing policy (i.e., fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing or two-part tariff licensing). Second, this paper attempts to ascertain the effects of product differentiation and technology spillover on the optimal licensing policy for the innovating firm.
We develop a duopoly game model with three stages: (1) the R&D stage, in which the firm engages in a cost-reducing innovation with a success probability of p ; (2) the licensing stage, in which the innovating firm can either protect its technology patent or allow another firm to adopt its technology (if the innovating firm does not license its technology, it will become a monopoly, and if the innovating firm decides to license its technology to another firm, it must determine a reasonable and acceptable price for the licensee); and (3) the output stage, in which the licensor and the licensee compete in the product market in a Cournot competition. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we study the innovator's optimal licensing strategy under uncertain R&D outcome conditions. However, the extant literature discusses the optimal licensing strategy only under the condition that R&D is successful, without considering a stochastic outcome. Second, we examine the impact of both product differentiation and technology spillover on the innovator's licensing strategy, whereas the extant literature focuses primarily on the former (e.g., Wang, 2002; , and less research centers on technology spillover. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to explore the joint influence of product differentiation and technology spillover on licensing strategy. Third, we illustrate that the amount of R&D investment is also closely related to the innovator's choice of licensing policy. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we address the case of non-licensing as a benchmark. We present the model and investigate three licensing policies in Section 4. Section 5 analyses the optimal licensing strategy from the perspective of the innovator. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 6. All technical proofs are provided in the appendix.
Modeling Assumptions
We consider a quantity competition model in which two downstream firms (firm i and firm j ) conduct a Cournot competition game and two firms produce differentiated products in the same market. Suppose firm i can achieve a licensable innovation, but the R&D outcome is uncertain. The other firm, firm j , does not produce anything innovative. Consistent with Wang (2002) , we assume that the linear inverse demand functions are () Technology innovation can be divided into drastic and non-drastic innovations in accordance with the magnitude of the innovation. With a drastic innovation, the innovating firm can expel other firms from the market that have only the old technology if licensing does not occur. Otherwise, the innovation is non-drastic. In other words, without licensing, innovators with a drastic innovation will monopolize the market, whereas those with a non-drastic innovation must confront market competition. This paper focuses solely on the condition of non-drastic innovation for simplicity; however, drastic innovation problems can be solved in a similar manner.
When technology licensing occurs between the two firms, we consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, firm i chooses value p to determine the optimal R&D investment. In the second stage, if firm i succeeds in R&D, it will decide whether to license the new technology to firm j , while the latter can choose to accept or reject the license. In the third stage, firm i and firm j engage in a Cournot competition in the product market. While optimizing their objective functions, we assume that both of the two firms have access to the same information. We use backward induction to solve this problem.
We first study the case without technology licensing to perform a comparative analysis with the following three licensing policies.
Benchmark Model: No Licensing
In the case of an uncertain R&D outcome, there are two possible reasons for firm i not to license: failure in R&D or unwillingness to license with successful R&D. We illustrate these two situations below.
Successful R&D But no Licensing
In the output stage, firm i and firm j engage in output Cournot competition. When firm i succeeds in R&D before licensing with a probability of p , the marginal cost for firm i is 0, whereas for firm j , it is 
where superscript S denotes successful R&D without licensing. By solving the above problems, we can further obtain the two firms' equilibrium quantities:
0 S j q  will always be true because of non-drastic innovation. Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), we obtain the equilibrium profits of the two firms when R&D is successful but does not lead to licensing.
Failure in R&D
If the innovation process ends in failure, the marginal costs for the two firms remain 
where superscript N denotes that R&D ends in failure.
We can obtain the two firms' equilibrium quantities by optimizing Eq. (4): (5) into Eq. (4), and equilibrium profits can be obtained:
d (6) Then, we can derive the two firms' expected profits according to Eq. (3) and Eq. (6).
Main Model

Fixed-fee Licensing
In this subsection, we consider licensing by means of a fixed fee only. Under fixed-fee licensing, firm i licenses its new technology to firm j at a fixed-fee, F , whose price is irrelevant to the quantity of product that firm j will produce by applying the new technology.
The Output Stage
If firm i succeeds in R&D with probability p in the first stage of the game, but licensing occurs in the second stage, the two firms will share the same 
F denotes the case of fixed-fee licensing. The two firms' equilibrium quantities are given by (2 ) 
If firm i fails in R&D, the equilibrium quantities and equilibrium profits are given by Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), respectively.
The Licensing stage
If firm i succeeds in R&D with a probability of p and fixed-fee licensing occurs, firm i 's optimization problem is represented as follows.
Supposing that firm i has full bargaining power, i.e., firm i can obtain all the additional payoff of firm j , the maximum fixed fee is then
(11) After fixed-fee licensing, the additional profits for the two firms are 
d . Corollary 1 shows that in the case of non-drastic innovation and an uncertain R&D outcome, the innovator prefers to license its technology by means of a fixed fee if the products from the two firms are substantially different; otherwise, the innovator is motivated to license via a fixed fee only if the technology spillover is high.
The R&D Stage
In the first stage of the game, firm i chooses the value of p to decide the optimal R&D investment to maximize its expected profits. Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq.
(9), we can obtain the profit of firm i when R&D is successful and fixed-fee licensing occurs:
Then, for a failure in R&D with a probability of 1 p , fixed-fee licensing will not occur, and the two firms' profits are given by Eq. (6). We establish () EF i p  to express the expected profit for fixed-fee licensing:
where the superscript EF denotes the expected value for fixed-fee licensing.
We take the first-order derivative of () 
Royalty Licensing
In this subsection, we consider licensing by means of a royalty only. Under royalty licensing, firm i licenses its cost-reducing technology to firm j at a fixed royalty rate, r , and firm i will gain a royalty amount that depends on firm j 's production quantity applying the new technology.
The Output Stage
In the output stage, firm i and firm j engage in an 
If firm i fails in R&D considering the uncertainty of the outcome, equilibrium profits are given by Eq. (6).
The Licensing Stage
If firm i succeeds in R&D with probability p and royalty licensing occurs, firm i 's optimization problem is represented as follows. 
Because we assume that firm i has full bargaining power, the maximum royalty rate that firm i can charge (17) with respect to r without considering whether firm j accepts, and from the first-order condition, we can (2 )(4 2 ) 2(8 3 ) (1 ) 0
, which meets the prerequisites for non-drastic innovation. 
rr  , we obtain the optimal royalty rate; 
The R&D stage
In this stage, firm i chooses a value of p to decide the optimal R&D investment to maximize expected profits.
When R&D is successful with probability p , the expected profits and probability of success are related to the degree of technology spillover. When
where superscript ER denotes the expected value in the case of royalty licensing.
Two-Part Tariff Licensing
In this subsection, we consider licensing by means of a hybrid license consisting of a fixed-fee ( F ) and a per unit royalty ( r ). Under two-part tariff licensing, the total licensing fee that firm i charges is When licensing occurs, firm i 's unit production cost is zero, and firm j 's unit production cost is r . 
If firm i fails in R&D, equilibrium profits are given by Eq. (6). 
The Licensing Stage
F ≥ 0, we can obtain the maximum per unit royalty within firm j 's acceptance, i.e., 
Take the partial derivative of Eq. (30) 
The R&D Stage
In this stage, firm i determines its optimal R&D investment by choosing p to maximize expected profit. 
where EFR denotes the expected value for the case of two-part tariff licensing. Take the first-order partial derivative of Eq. (32) with respect to p , and from the first-order condition, we obtain 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Optimal Licensing Decision
In this section, we assume that all three licensing strategies are available to the innovator. In section 4, we derived firm i 's profits. To find firm i 's optimal decision, we must compare the profits of firm i under different licensing scenarios and choose the profit-maximizing strategy.
Comparison: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty Licensing
If both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing are available to the licensor, which is the better choice? To find the answer, we will compare the probability of occurrence and expected profits under these two situations. If 
If 22 1 (2 )(4 2 ) 2 (8 3 ) 
Proposition 1 shows that p can also reflect the R&D , the opposite is true; and if FR pp  , the two licensing scenarios share the same R&D investment.
Comparing the related equations above, we find that the sign of Eq. (28) is the same as the sign of Eq. (29), which is also true for Eq. (27) Proposition 2 indicates that the advantages and disadvantages of the two licensing policies are closely related to product differentiation and technology spillover. Thus, compared with the above two policies, is two-part tariff licensing the best choice? A comparison between the two is required to answer this question. , we must perform the analysis in two separate intervals according to Proposition 2, i.e., 
, from which . Therefore, as for the two solutions to the quadratic equation in (1 ) 
), the probability of occurrence of two-part tariff licensing is higher than that of the other two licensing policies; when technology spillover is high (
), two-part tariff licensing and royalty licensing will occur with the same probability.
From this proposition, we can see that the occurrence probability can serve as a reflection of the R&D investment with different licensing policies. Thus, in two-part tariff licensing, a high occurrence probability indicates comparatively high investment. Proposition 4 indicates that in the case of non-drastic innovation, when the licensor has full bargaining power, two-part tariff licensing is superior to the other two means of licensing as long as the technology spillover is lower than the critical value (i.e., 
Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the optimal licensing strategy from the perspective of an inside innovator when the product market has a differentiated Cournot structure. The patentee has a patent on a cost-reducing innovation and optimizes his overall return by choosing fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing or two-part tariff licensing. We develop a duopoly model with three stages, namely, the R&D stage, the licensing stage and the output stage. We investigate the joint impact of R&D outcome uncertainty and technology spillover on the optimal licensing strategy.
We have shown that (i) royalty licensing is always superior to no licensing regardless of the technology spillover and product differentiation (whether fixed-fee licensing and two-part tariff licensing will occur is related to technology spillover and product differentiation); (ii) if the conditions permit both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing, the innovating firm's choice will depend on the degree of technology spillover and product differentiation; and (iii) if the technology spillover is high, two-part tariff licensing is equivalent to royalty licensing. Otherwise, the patentee tends to license by means of a two-part tariff. Product differentiation does not influence the effectiveness of two-part tariff licensing.
Result (ii) is complementary to the result in (Wang, 2002) , who compares fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing in a differentiated Cournot duopoly model for an inside innovator and shows that royalty licensing may be superior to fixed-fee licensing. However, (Wang, 2002) fails to consider the effects of the uncertainty of R&D outcomes and technology spillover on the innovator's licensing policy. Result (iii) provides possible theoretical explanations for the empirical observations in Rostoker (1984) , who conducts a survey among 150 American companies regarding the use of technology licensing and finds that 13 % of them license technology by means of a fixed fee, that 39 % of them choose royalty licensing, and that two-part tariff licensing is adopted by 46 % of the companies. The findings in this paper are consistent with the results of that survey in that two-part tariff licensing has an advantage over the other two licensing policies when technology spillover is low.
There are several interesting topics for further research illuminated in this paper. First, this paper assumes that the licensor has full bargaining power, which is not applicable in practice because the licensing fee is typically a compromise between the licensor and the licensee after bargaining. Future research can relax this assumption and explore licensing strategy decision-making with incomplete bargaining power. Second, we assume that there is only one firm conducting R&D and licensing its innovation in the technology market, which is contrary to the fact that many firms typically co-exist and compete with one another. Thus, one significant extension would be to consider how a number of firms simultaneously determine the optimal licensing strategy. Third, there is only one licensee in this paper. Therefore, another interesting extension to our research would be to investigate the effect of competition among multiple licensees on the optimal licensing strategy. i undertaking a non-drastic innovation, if the R&D is successful but licensing does not occur, the quantity for firm j should be greater than 0, i.e., ((2 ) 2(1 ) ) 
